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EMPATHIC SADISM 
How Readers Get Implicated 
FRITZ BREITHAUPT 
A good book draws you in, makes you feel involved in the story, makes you care 
about the characters. It’s a sign of a successful story when the struggles of the 
characters affect you—but do readers always feel the same emotions as the characters 
they are reading about? Of course not. 
For one thing, readers often know more or less than characters. They see the danger 
lurking while the character is still perfectly happy, or they are in the dark about a char-
acters happy thoughts. Readers will react to the behavior of the character. For instance, 
when a character makes a morally suspect move, a reader may say: “Oh no, don’t do 
that!” and feel anger toward the character.1 Readers also may side with one particular 
character, making them less likely to share the emotions of another. These examples 
show that we are entering a complex field of possibilities when dealing with reader emo-
tions and empathy.2 
Some scholars may simply shrug and leave reader emotions outside of their investi-
gation, but this is not a possibility for me. For me, narrative is not simply a textual phe-
nomenon, but takes place in the mind of the reader. Hence, I need to face the question of 
how affective reader reactions come about. 
This chapter focuses on one specific aspect of the discrepancy between character 
emotion and reader emotion, namely the happiness that readers can derive from the 
suffering of characters (as well as real people). To be more precise, the chapter will 
examine cases where the positive emotions of the reader are derived from experiencing 
empathy with a suffering character. We will call this form of empathy “empathic sadism.” 
The examples listed above, however, would not usually fall into this category; although 
they may invoke sympathy for a character, that is, wishing the character well without 
necessarily understanding his or her emotions, they do not involve empathy.3 
The premise of this chapter may thus sound paradoxical: because readers empathize 
with a character who is suffering, they can feel good themselves. Maybe it is a paradox, 
but it is one that can be explained, as evident in the following example. Families of 
victims of violent crime in the United States often wish to witness the execution of the 
criminal. The satisfaction they feel watching the execution, even as it seems that they 
want to see and feel the pain of the perpetrator,4 could be regarded as a form of 
empathic sadism. It seems reasonable that “feeling the pain” of the offender helps them 
to feel the sweetness of revenge. We will consider later how these sweet feelings may 
also arise in cases where the suffering person deserves our support. 
On a general level, this chapter contends that the paradoxical emotions involved in 
empathic sadism are not rare for readers of literary texts, and are moreover a key moti-
vation for reading many literary texts, including certain canonical ones. More specific to 
the context of narratology, the chapter argues for a differentiation between the implied 
reader and an implication of the reader in the process of reading. The implied reader is a 
location in the narratological model of the text: the set assumptions the text (or the 
author) makes about who will be reading it, and how readers will or should evaluate it. 
But what I am calling the implicated reader is stronger: a reader whose involvement in 
the text draws him or her into the moral constellation of the text, perhaps even making 
the reader somehow guilty for the suffering of a character. I begin by first classifying dif-
ferent phenomena of empathic sadism, before moving to literary works and considering 
two examples of late nineteenth-century fiction, namely La Regenta by Leopoldo Alas, 
alias Clarin (1884/85) and Effi Briest by Theodor Fontane(i896). 
 
Empathic Sadism or Empathy for Empathy’s Sake 
In his influential essay “These Things Called Empathy: Eight Related but Distinct 
Phenomena,” Daniel C. Batson catalogs what various thinkers and various scholars 
have called empathy.5 Curiously, these definitions indicate that empathy is not always 
focused on the object of empathy, the empathizee, but rather on its subject, the empa- 
thizer. In fact, Batson notes that the original meaning of empathy, coined in English by 
Titchener in 1909 as the translation of Theodor Lipps’s German word Einfuhlung, is an 
observer-/empathizer-focused process. Accordingly, he defines this form of empathy as “
the process whereby a person imagines what it would be like to be some specific person 
or some inanimate object, such as a gnarled, dead tree on a windswept hillside.”6 
Obviously the tree in this example has little to gain from the empathizer, even if it were 
not already dead. In fact, such exercises of the imagination could encourage 
aestheticists to cultivate gnarly trees growing in forbidding environments. 
Well, a tree is a tree, but most people nowadays would agree that empathy with other 
people is a key feature of humanity. Feeling like others (Batson, concept 3) and coming 
to an understanding of what they are feeling or thinking (Batson, concept 1) allows us to 
be truly social beings. Thus it seems that we have and use empathy for morally good 
reasons: We help a person drowning in a pool, we often share food (unlike most other 
primates), we are good at determining the needs of our young, and we can judge not 
simply what someone did, but with what intentions he or she acted. When we relate to 
the suffering of others (Batson concepts 7 and 8), we usually aim to eliminate that 
suffering. 
However, the case of the gnarly tree and self-focus inherent in many or all of these 
concepts may give us pause. When does the observer’s interest in the experience of 
empathy trump the well-being of the empathizee? When does empathy transform into a 
paradoxical mode of self-focus? Put differently, when does empathy begin to serve only 
the empathizer, becoming something like empathy for empathy’s sake? 
In what follows, we will examine the self-focused forms of empathy that risk causing 
its object misery, or perhaps even desire the suffering of the other. In particular, we will 
distinguish different phenomena called empathy that involve the suffering of the other. 
Our emphasis will be on forms related to fiction, but not exclusively so. 
 
Self-Focused Vicarious Empathy 
One of the common explanations of why we enjoy fiction is that it expands the horizon of 
our experiences. While we probably do not have the experience of being an explorer in 
Africa in the eighteenth century, enduring the hardships of the Napoleonic wars, being a 
bullied and abused servant in the Victorian age, or rescuing ourselves from an army of 
zombies, we may still enjoy imagining how it would feel to be in these situations. We are 
“going for a ride,” as Blakey Vermeule characterized this reading experience.7 In this 
process, we share and yet do not share the feelings of the characters. We see and 
recognize the suffering and dangers of the characters, but we are still able to enjoy them 
because they involve excitement, change, and resolution. Here, the well-being of the 
other (the character) may be something we wish for, but only in the long run. Before the 
level of long-term happiness is reached, we need the character to go through these 
hardships like the gnarly tree. Oh, did it die? What a pity! 
It is obvious that this concept is widely applicable to the reading of fiction and might in 
fact be most common there. Readers participate vicariously in characters and their 
situations, without having to fear that the fictional characters will turn around and ask 
them for money.8 Participation is especially enhanced when there are changes, 
developments, and solutions expected in temporal sequences. 
 
Predictive, Self-Empowering Empathy or Sadistic Empathy 
Instead of simply going along for a ride with another person (or character), we might I 
also setting the other person up for that very ride, manipulating their situation in order I to 
enjoy our own correct predictions of his or her emotions and states. These manipulations 
make it easier for the observer to anticipate the affective and other cognitive results I in 
the other. Sadistic or predictive empathy is a manipulation of another that allows one to 
predict or anticipate the others feelings in order to more easily simulate or understand 
him or her. Such empathy is pleasurable regardless of whether or not we “care” for the 
other and wish him or her well. Sadistic or predictive empathy ranges from knowing that 
the other will have an emotional reaction to a precise estimation or simulation to 
predicting exactly what he or she will feel. The emphasis here is on what one could call a 
self-affirming effect. Three real-life practices in particular come to mind: 
Retributive pain empathy. When punishing someone else, we desire the pain of the 
other. To be sure, the punishers vicarious feeling of the others pain is not necessarily 
part of all punishments. We may understand punishing a child as an act of education, for 
instance. In many cases, however, the punisher may want to feel the other’s pain as a 
way of getting back at him or her. Even our seemingly modern penal code of law seems 
to acknowledge the desire to get even, as evident in the fact that family members who 
wish to watch the perpetrators be killed are often allowed to do so. Knowing that some-
one finds “justice” behind bars, on the gallows, or by being singled out in court may still 
carry the emotional knowledge of the criminal’s pain, and even simulate it in some 
instances. The satisfaction of seeing justice served may result from a transformation of 
other-focused empathy into self-gratification.9 
Sadism. Many human acts can be labeled sadistic, even when leaving the question of 
psychopathy out of this discussion. Sadists enjoy inflicting pain on others or watching the 
pain of others. Now, where does this enjoyment come from? Even if a sadist’s attitude is 
to say: “Your pain does not move me,” he or she will still seem to have desired this very 
pain, perhaps simply to assert his superiority over the other. Or perhaps this sense of 
superiority depends on feeling that very pain and thus being able to say with certainty: “I 
can cause these feelings in you!” 
Manipulative predictive empathy. Sadism, as we just characterized it, is certainly not 
an attractive form of empathy. Yet I would like to suggest that a small dose of empathetic 
sadism is part of everyday behavior. There are multiple forms of negative behavior that 
may be undertaken for the sake of enabling empathy. When one criticizes someone else, 
it can be to correct bad behavior, or to get even with this person. It can also be to make 
the other feel bad in a predictable way, which allows the criticizer to “tune in” to his or her 
emotions. In general, many manipulations can bring about and intensify those situations 
and scenarios that allow one to predict, know, and feel someone else’s emotions. 
Examples of acts that facilitate the prediction of another person’s feelings include 
embarrassing, shaming, teasing, disappointing, testing, moralizing, mistreatment of 
subordinates in the workplace, sexual domination, playing devil’s advocate in moral sit-
uations, and so on, often in quite subtle or ironic forms. This predictive quality can also 
include positive feelings, ranging from the joy of giving a gift and anticipating the reaction 
of the receiver, to learning situations, where the observer is happy about an insight of the 
learner. 
Of course, readers of fiction do not usually manipulate actual texts (leaving digital 
fiction aside). They are however, constantly entertaining expectations of what will, might, 
or should happen in a given situation. What is more, it seems likely—though I would not 
even begin trying to prove this—that without expectations, predictions, and preferences 
in the reader’s mind, narrative fiction would be impossible.10 The correctness of these 
expectations matters. Some of the most significant moments in my personal reading 
experience have come when what I expected or wanted to happen did not. These 
expectations can come in various forms: suspense,11 predictions, preferences,12 or 
suspicion. It can be noted that already Aristotle built his theory of poetics on the central 
notion of a temporal development toward a catharsis. According to his theory, the 
cathartic moment is the moment of a “forking” whereby the logical expectations of a 
character split from the actual events driven by another logical development.13 Even 
what seems to be a possible exception, namely the dead, gnarly tree, might fit in here. In 
that case, to empathize might mean to understand the past forces that have made the 
tree into what it is now. 
 
Empathic or “Sadistic Benefactor” 
A related but distinct pleasure in the negative emotions of the other has recently been 
identified by Lisa Zunshine as the “sadistic benefactor.” A sadistic benefactor wants to “
force others into revealing their feelings through body language.”14 This would seem to 
correspond with the predictive, self-empowering empathy described above. However, 
Zunshine adds a twist by giving a positive bend to the motivation of the empathizer. 
Ultimately, these empathizers intend to do good. They force others into a state of misery 
or suffering, only to then uplift them into a state of happiness made even more intense by 
the prior misery. It is not clear in retrospect whether the prior negative feelings of the 
empathizee served the sadistic pleasures of the empathizer and the final positive twist is 
only a cover-up, or whether the prior negative feelings served to heighten the happiness 
of the character even more. (Zunshine’s examples, such as Sarah Fielding’s Lord 
Dorchester or Rousseau’s Jean-Jacques as educator of Emile either leave this question 
open or lean toward the latter). Hence, in contrast to the predictive, self-empowering 
empathy, the sadistic benefactor ultimately focuses on the extreme turn of emotions of 
the other from bad to good. And in contrast to the self-focused vicarious empathy, the 
sadistic benefactor already knows and predicts the positive feeling of the empathizee 
(the victim). 
So far, our examples have concerned the plot of stories and our sadistic benefactors 
have been characters, such as Jean-Jacques. But we may also ask whether the attitude 
of a sadistic benefactor may also be present in the reader-character relation, or reader’s 
contract. I believe that it is. I suspect that this attitude can represent the reader’s emo-
tional side in what has been called the “trial narrative,” one of the two kinds of basic plots 
for fiction distinguished by Vivasvan Soni (the other being the tragic plot).15 In the trial 
narrative, a hero is put to a test and must suffer greatly for the sake of the ultimate 
reward. Examples for this story type are the temptation of Jesus in the desert, most 
bildungsromans, and Samuel Richardson’s Pamela; or Virtue Rewarded (1740). Why do 
readers enjoy these trial narratives? One part of the answer may be that the reader is a 
kind of empathic or sadistic benefactor: because we expect that the trial may be for the 
ultimate good, we like to feel more suffering and misery. 
 
Advocative Exploitative Empathy 
It is certainly a good thing to have sympathy for and empathy with someone who is suf-
fering. Even better is to be the sufferer’s advocate, the voice of the voiceless. Be that as 
it may, it is fair to ask what the mental rewards for the advocate are. The knowledge of 
doing good can be one. However, there may also be a more complicated emotional 
mechanism at work. Similar to the sadistic benefactor, the advocative exploitative 
empathizer (or: the empathic exploitative advocate) may use his or her morally good 
advocacy to cover up some empathic reveling in the pain of others. 
Samuel Richardson’s Pamela; or Virtue Rewarded (1740) and his Clarissa, or The 
History of a Young Lady (1748) famously single out innocent suffering characters. What 
is “attractive” for the reader about these suffering women is probably neither simply the 
predictive quality of understanding the misery of the suffering character, nor simply the 
feeling of wishing for a good end (as in the empathic or sadistic benefactor), though both 
are likely to come into play. Rather, the specific mechanism here might be the observed 
misery that awakens and arouses the reader to decry the injustice or cruelty. 
Turning the reader into an advocate has an obvious and good moral effect when the 
reader takes the correct side in a conflict and stands up for the innocent suffering 
character. However, turning the reader into an advocate may also make the 
advocate-reader dependent on the very misfortune or injustice. The reader can only 
fashion him- or herself into an advocate so long as the injustice and suffering continue. 
As a consequence, a perverse duality is at work: the reader wishes for the good but 
simultaneously wishes to prolong the suffering.16 (This dynamic will be further developed 
below.) 
These four forms of empathy all share the self-focus of the empathizer. These forms 
of sadistic empathy can all be termed empathy for empathy’s sake in analogy to 
art-for-art’s-sake, a means of stressing that this empathy does not directly benefit its 
object. On the lower levels of the pyramid, the empathizer merely tracks the states of the 
empathizee (“going for a ride”). On the higher levels, suffering of the empathizee 
becomes a source of enjoyment for the empathizer (see figure 21.1). 
To be sure, this list is not complete and among other things does not consider psy-
choanalytic categories or aesthetic feelings, such as the sublime, that may include 
empathy. The list nevertheless provides a good starting point for discussing the dark 
sides of reader empathy, for it allows us to pinpoint the odd state of reader involvement 
that goes beyond “going for a ride” and mere prediction to deriving pleasure from actual 
manipulation (as sadistic benefactor) or advocacy. This is what we will discuss in the 




Figure 21.1 Degrees of sadistic empathy 
 
La Regenta and Sadistic Empathy 
In the previous section, we discussed how the observation of a characters suffering 
might be desirable for a reader.17 In the following, we will look into a striking literary 
technique that draws readers into a specific form of sadistic empathy. To that end, we 
will examine the portrayal of adultery in two works of late nineteenth-century fiction, 
namely La Regenta (1884/85) by Leopoldo Alas, alias Clarln, and Theodor Fontane’s Effi 
Briest (1896). These works stem from a lineage of adultery texts that prominently include 
Goethes Elective Affinities (1809) and Flaubert’s Madame Bovary (1856). Both are 
representative of the historical period of realism, whose strategic focus on depicting the 
intricate minutiae of everyday life allows and denies insights into the characters. That 
being said, the strategies we will examine can be found in other periods as well. For the 
present purpose, I do not presuppose prior knowledge of these novels. 
It is perhaps no wonder that La Regenta has only in recent decades achieved the 
fame it deserves.18 Not only does the novel address the scandalous topic of adultery, 
and paint a scathing portrait of its setting, the Spanish city of Oviedo, but it also places 
an unreasonable demand on the reader: It gives us no positive or even compelling figure 
to identify with. 
The novel portrays a nearly hopeless situation. Donna Ana Ozores, the Regenta and 
wife of a retired judge, is the “pearl” of the provincial capital “Vetustas,” a fictional 
Oviedo.19 She is the “most beautiful woman in the city” and a most desirable prize for 
both the leading priest, the ambitious canon Don Fermin de Pas, and the local Don 
Juan-like womanizer and leader of the progressive party, Don Alvaro. Prior to the action 
of the novel, Ana Ozores has led a life unfulfilled in every way. Her parents died young, 
her education left her isolated, and her husband, a harmless eccentric, is an old and 
impotent but mostly well-meaning man completely devoid of any passion for his wife. 
She has every reason to want a change in circumstances. She has no children, and 
because of her husbands impotence (or closeted homosexuality) she has little cause for 
hope. Over the course of many hundred pages the novel describes the tug of war 
between Don Fermin and Don Alvaro as the two men vie for Donna Ana. Don Fermin 
des Pas offers Donna Ana spiritual awakening, while Don Alvaro offers bodily, erotic 
fulfillment, but each does so for his own selfish aims. The tides of war keep turning. At 
first one will have the upper hand, then the other. Both are counting on a victory. Two 
unknown voices summarize this struggle as follows: 
“But which one is going to get the cat to wet its feet?” 
“What cat?” 
“Its feet or her feet?” 
“The canon theologian.” 
“Alvaro.” 
“Or both of them.” 
“Or neither.”20 
It is this conflict between the suitors, rather than the psychological nuance, social criti-
cism, and analysis of gender roles, that brings the novel to life. Without this suspense, 
the novel would not exist. Readers of the novel will most likely ask themselves what will 
happen (probability) and what ought to happen (preference) to Ana.21 
In the course of the novel, something strange occurs. In observing how Don Fermin 
and Don Alvaro launch their “attacks” on Ana, the reader figures out the self-interested 
game the men are playing. During each of their respective “assaults” on Ana, the reader 
will be unlikely to side with the aggressor, be it Fermin or Alvaro. Although the narratives 
are usually told from the perspective of the two men, especially Fermin, the implied 
preference is against the male attacker. Of course that doesn’t mean readers could not 
root for the aggressor, but because the narration is interspersed with reminders of the 
selfishness of the two men, it seems likely that most readers will root against them. So 
far, this side-taking is not strange at all. 
In order to describe this preference, it makes sense to speak of the implied reader (or 
authorial audience), who develops a moral preference for Ana. The implied reader is, in 
a classic definition by Wayne Booth, “the reader who the implied author writes to.”22 This 
definition involves knowledge, since the implied reader needs to have a degree of 
historical and cultural understanding in order to make sense of the text.23 This knowl-
edge component is sometimes described as a contextual anchoring of a narrative text.24 
Yet narratologists such as James Phelan have taken the concept of the implied reader 
farther, suggesting that the implied reader also evaluates the characters and events 
emotionally as well as ethically. This evaluative function of the implied reader comes into 
play especially in cases of unreliable narrators; that is to say, when it appears that the 
narrator cannot be trusted. In these instances, the implied readers “reject those words 
[by the narrator] and, if possible, reconstruct a more satisfactory account... or... accept 
what the narrator says but then supplement the account.”25 This account echoes the 
earlier definition of the implied reader as formulated in 1972 by Wolfgang Iser, who pro-
posed that the task of the implied reader is to bring unconnected narrative elements, 
such as narrative voice, perspective, or plot elements, into a relationship with each other 
when the text fails to provide clear connection or evaluation.26 
This function of the implied reader may at first seem sufficient to explain what hap-
pens here. However, as we will shortly see, the concept of the implied reader cannot fully 
explain what happens with actual audiences and readers of these texts. In a step-by-step 
discussion first of La Regenta then of Effi Briest, we will trace how these novels bring the 
implied reader into a paradoxical situation with moral implications. To be sure, the con-
cept of the implied reader seems well suited to describe the readers’ reservations 
regarding Fermfn and Alvaro. 
On the one hand, the Catholic Fermfn de Pas wants to make Donna Ana into his “
slave.” This would increase his influence in the city since Ana, the “pearl of the city,” has 
such a symbolically elevated status.27 And indeed, his stock in the city moves up when 
Ana Ozores prominently participates in a Catholic ritual, proceeding through the city 
barefoot in the Easter parade. In addition, he has, without quite admitting it, fallen in love 
with Ana. Unfortunately for Fermfn, becoming the lover of a Catholic priest is simply not 
an option for Ana. To this we should perhaps add that Fermfn is not only a manipulative, 
predictive empathizer who reads and controls people around him for selfish purposes, 
but as we learn later in the novel, also already has and mistreats a mistress.28 
On the other hand, a victory for the seducer Alvaro doesn’t have much to offer Ana 
either. Don Alvaro is a consummate trophy-hunting ladies’ man. He wants to win Ana 
and enjoy her for the simple reason that he has always gotten what he wanted, and 
wants to convince himself that he will be able to keep getting what he wants even as he 
grows older. He does not care that the stigma of adultery would destroy her. At first he 
refrains from physical intimacies, but only strategically, because he knows that he could 
lose her if he is too aggressive. Instead he strikes up a friendship with her husband, 
deploys his friends as spies to get closer to her, and feigns tears in his false confession 
of love. 
Given this setup of the novel, one might think that readers would lean toward iden-
tifying with Donna Ana or at least side with her empathetically. And certainly, this is what 
we could expect in most works of fiction since the eighteenth century, such as in the 
aforementioned novels of Samuel Richardson. The case of La Regenta, however, is 
different. It is different because empathizing with Ana would mean accepting and taking 
on the gamut of her unattractive qualities: her blindness and naivete, her religious 
sentimentality, her arrogance, and her self-deceit. For example, she is dishonest to 
herself when she indulges in a spiritual love with Alvaro,29 she has easily exploitable 
prejudices,30 and she pities herself and glorifies her life as “martyrdom” simply because 
her husband is a bit grumpy.31 Still, fiction is full of cases where readers identify gladly 
with naive or self-deceiving characters, ranging from Don Quixote to Jane Austen’s 
characters. 
The difficulty here is that Ana has no goal, not even an implied one. Without a trajec-
tory, it is hard to empathize with her. In the first section of this chapter, we suggested that 
reader empathy is usually connected with the expectation of change, development, and 
solutions. Without such future expectation, projection, or development, and without a 
mind that focuses on her own interest and intention, Ana Ozores is sealed off from most 
forms of empathy from the reader. As a result, it is hard to care for her. It is much easier 
to relate to someone with a trajectory, outlook, or goal, even if it is an evil one, as in 
slasher movies32 or in a film like Silence of Lambs,33 than with someone who has none, 
such as Ana. This lack of goal-driven behavior, a state almost without dreams, seems to 
rob Ana of an identity. Of course, this does not mean that actual readers have not 
identified with her. Those readers who do identify or empathize with Ana, though, 
probably do not affirm the hopelessness of her situation, but either invent fantastic new 
paths for her or are forced to ignore parts of the novel. As much as most readers may 
want the best for her, it is nevertheless difficult to see things from her point of view for 
long enough to develop empathy since there is nothing to see in her future. Anas 
unavailability for reader empathy is also stressed in her distance from the narrator, who 
even scolds her a few times.34 
To be clear, the majority of readers as well as the implied reader will in most places 
be morally on Anas side, due in no small part to her innocence, her status as a victim, 
and her complete lack of malevolence. At the same time, it seems more precise to say 
that readers are not so much directly siding with her, as they are morally siding against 
her attackers. After all, she is the victim of the intrigues of these two men as well as 
others. This rooting against her attackers, however, does not transform into a lasting 
perspective-taking and full empathy. Actual readers may find themselves in an odd posi-
tion; on the one hand, they adopt the perspective of the implied reader (who is against 
the attackers and thus is morally for Ana), while also taking the perspective of and per-
haps even identifying with her attackers for short periods of time (for they at least have 
ambitions for the future). If we recall the cathartic moment of “forking” described by 
Aristotle, Clarins novel would appear to offer a “fork” between reader preference (or 
sympathy) by the implied reader and perspective-taking (a step toward full empathy). 
What effect does this “fork” have in this novel? Again, Clarins narrative invites 
readers to take the cognitive and affective perspective of many characters, mostly of the 
goal-driven Fermin, but also Alvaro and many minor characters such as Obdulia, Visita, 
Petra, and so on, without however siding with them. Still, the implied readers preference 
for Ana, the innocent, naive victim, creates a conflict. Transforming the 
perspective-taking with the attackers into a lasting identification and full empathy would 
in effect affirm their selfish aims and the destruction of Ana. As we well know, these 
attackers are no heroes, and when Ana resists, both male protagonists try to punish her 
for her hesitation.35 Nevertheless, the slope from focalization to perspective-taking and 
identification is slippery. 
The tension between the implied reader and perspective-taking does not lead to a 
clear solution, despite our assumption that actual readers want to empathize with some-
one. But because the subtleties of the novel rule out every possible candidate (the only 
good person appears as a mere witness on the last pages of the thousand-page novel), 
there is no strong narrator to identify with and no clear implied author other than perhaps 
a sarcastic puppeteer who mostly remains in the background. In the end, neither 
perspective-taking nor the implied reader leads to full empathy. 
More than the others, Ana resists attempts at identification or full empathy. As things 
stand in her current state (mentally, spiritually, psychologically, physically, sexually, etc.), 
she is unbalanced and unsatisfied. The novel repeatedly describes her hang-ups 
through metaphors involving the blocked circulation of fluids.36 Ana never does what the 
well-wishing implied reader hopes she will, even though she does possess a certain, 
albeit limited, room for maneuvering. Yet for hundreds of pages Ana takes no action. 
What happens, then, to the reader looking to empathize when there is no one left to 
identify with? If literature were created for the simple game of identifying with characters, 
for experiencing their emotions, sharing their perspective and, in essence, caring for 
them, then one would have to conclude that this novel is not very successful, because it 
does not allow perspective-taking beyond the duration of single episodes. It is always 
temporary and always with the wrong person. Nevertheless, the reader remains active 
and actively searching for an orienting point of view. 
Here I would like to suggest that readers become creative and invent a position for 
empathy when there is no point of view that the reader can simply morally adopt. Instead 
of simply choosing from the existing characters, the reader becomes productive. This 
productivity takes the form of inventing possibilities and positions that are not present in 
the text, but which ought to exist. The creative potential inherent in side-taking comes to 
light in Clarin’s creative and experimental setup, which goes significantly farther than its 
grand predecessor, Flaubert’s Madame Bovary. 
What does the reader who supports Ana make of her inactivity and resistance? One 
possibility is that such a well-meaning reader succumbs to frustration with Ana for not 
cooperating with what he or she imagines will save her. This leaves one option: In order 
to be saved, Ana must fall, must be sacrificed. Thus the reader is put in a position similar 
to that of her pursuers, whose attraction transforms directly into fantasies of punishment. 
Even her so-called friend Visita enjoys “the pleasure of seeing her friend fall where she 
herself had fallen.”37 Neither the preferences of the implied reader nor perspective-taking 
give the novel its form. Rather, something outside the narrator’s and perhaps even the 
authors control occurs. In order to have empathy with Ana, it is necessary to force her 
into a predictable pattern of affects, which in this case seems to be possible only in a 
negative, violent way. 
The paradox of the novel lies in the reader’s alignment with Ana, an alignment that for 
some readers will lead them to identify with her attackers: those characters intent on 
criticizing her (Fermin, Petra, Visita) or taking advantage of her (Alvaro). In this 
three-person scenario (Ana, attacker, and reader), the reader’s preference for Ana may 
be transformed into an alignment with those characters whose actions will do her harm, 
because these very actions enable readers to predict Ana’s misery and thus finally 
facilitate reader empathy with her. In other words, we may adopt the attacker’s desire to 
destroy Ana in order to empathize with her, and this desire for empathy transforms into 
empathetic sadism. The very lack of a future for Ana, which served as to block empathy, 
now gives way to an acceptance of a dark future, but one that allows for change and 
predictive sadistic empathy. 
(Following the pattern of degrees of sadistic empathy above, we note that no figure of 
a sadistic benefactor is visible, at least not in the plot. This might present an opportunity 
for readers to engage with the text as sadistic benefactors, thinking that Ana’s suffering 
and fall could eventually lead to a better future, even though the novel does little to 
support this vague hope. Likewise, the impulse of reader advocacy for Ana seems too 
limited. Certainly, the impulse to side against her attackers will turn many readers into 
advocates for her. Ultimately however, her social position as well as her naive arrogance 
may prove too strong for her to be a good candidate for long-term side-taking.) 
This hypothetical reaction of readers to desire Ana’s suffering goes beyond what the 
concept of implied reader suggests. But how shall we then describe it? Before we jump 
to conclusions, I would like to point to a second related case. 
 
Effi Briest and the Implication of the Reader 
The ensuing argument will be conducted through a reading of Theodor Fontane’s Effi 
Briest, in order to further elaborate on the mechanism outlined above, the three-person 
alignment without identification.38 Though like La Regenta, Effi Briest constitutes another 
reaction to Madame Bovary, it is unlikely that Fontane was aware of Clarin’s novel. What 
is remarkable about the figure of Effi Briest is how much we know about her compared to 
how little information we gather directly from her and her inner states— much less than 
from Emma Bovary or Ana Ozores. Indeed, the other characters in the novel regularly 
speculate and make assumptions about the real Effi, how she feels, and what she is 
really like. Whether from her mother, her older husband Innstetten, or her lover 
Crampas, these assumptions are not harmless speculation, but convey in a more or less 
subtle manner how these people expect Effi to act. The speech Effi’s mother gives her 
early in the novel, when Effi asks her advice about Innstettens marriage proposal, is as 
telling as it is disastrous: 
It’s not the kind of thing to be joked about. You saw him the day before yesterday, 
and I think you liked him. Of course, he is older than you, which is a good thing all in all, 
and he is a man of character, position and sound morality, and if you don’t say no, which 
I would hardly expect from my clever Effi, then at twenty you’ll have a position others don
’t reach until they’re forty. You’ll go far further than your mamma.39 
The mother’s speech seems to usurp her daughter’s free choice, and yet right 
away she claims to understand her daughter. This belief comes across in the suggestive 
parenthetical phrase, “which I would hardly expect from my clever Effi.” The statement 
preempts Effi’s choice, so that the image of the free Effi appears only as a phantom 
against the backdrop of her usurped freedoms of choice and love. We do not see who 
Effi is, what she desires, or what she thinks—we only see how her own choices are 
withheld from her. Her mother’s manipulation keeps Effi from putting her own feet on the 
ground, and instead lodges them firmly on her mother’s own path: “You’ll go far further 
than your mamma.” And we should not be surprised to discover that Effi’s future 
husband is in fact her mother’s former lover. Her mother identifies with her daughter in 
such a way as to strip Effi of her free will. This is an illustrative scene in a novel where 
identification only figures as the violent act of stealing an identity. Whoever identifies with 
someone else forces that person into conformity with him- or herself. 
Michel Foucault would have called such identificatory assumptions about Effi “dis-
courses”; they try to dominate their object (Effi) through their language such that she only 
takes shape as a dominated figure under the control of the discourse. Rather than reveal 
who Effi is or what she wants, the novel only conveys what others think about her. 
Particularly telling are those moments in the novel when others aim to control Effi’s 
actions by means of their “discourse.” These discourses often take the form of 
narratives, such as the tale of the Chinese servant, a ghost story Effi s husband concocts 
to confine her to the home. Or they materialize as a form of assigning an identity to 
her—like that of a “little lamb, white as snow” at the same time that evidence of her affair 
is piling up. 
One can easily imagine that Effi is trying to hide something significant, namely her 
affair. Yet this is not quite correct; it is not that Effi necessarily wants to hide something, 
she simply never manages to express herself. In addition, the affair seems to arise not 
out of a true desire, but of desperation or boredom.40 Effi tries to tell her parents that she 
has changed, but they ignore or misunderstand her. Her mother, her husband Innstetten, 
her cousin, and so many others fail to consider the possibility that Effi does not conform 
to their idea of her and as a result, never acknowledge the power their assumptions have 
over her. At the very end of the novel, her parents finally do go so far as to admit that 
they might possibly have made a mistake in choosing Effi’s course in life. However, we 
do not learn whether they think that they might have misunderstood her. The distanced 
narrative voice offers no assistance to our heroine either, working instead to expose the 
discrepancy between what people assume about Effi and in what ways she might have 
been different. Exactly how she might have been different, if she was, is left unknown, 
and even her affair is just a cliched escapade. 
Effi is, presumably, not what people think she is. But what she actually is, is not 
revealed. This may well be the key difference between Theodor Fontane’s novel and 
Clarins: Ana may in reality be as empty as she fears,41 while Effi is an “empty space,” for 
the other characters as well as the readers who do not have insight into her thoughts 
(even the affair is only reported years afterwards when the love letters emerge). Still the 
novel keeps pointing to the possibility that she is being misunderstood, and this 
misperception is tantamount to an act of violence against her. Effi shares this alienation 
or strangeness with the spectral Chinese servant, another character with a mysterious “
nonpresence” in the novel.42 
Because no one in the novel takes the side of Effi (whom we only know in the 
distorted images of others), there is a call for someone to do what no one else does. 
Enter the reader. At first it seems that the concept of the implied reader (the authorial 
audience) is sufficient to capture the preference most readers will feel. In the case of this 
novel, the implied reader will likely be on Effi’s side and against that of her oppressors. 
The implied reader is a marker of dissonance, marking that which no one names but 
which should happen. In this sense, the implied reader is an archivist of discrepancy 
between what is and what could be. Since the reader is the only one pointing to the 
injustice and the necessity of noting it, he or she is drawn into the text and gains a 
presence in the novel as if he or she were a character. This needs some explanation. 
On some basic level, the implied reader’s tasks in Effi Briest and La Regenta are 
similar: to mentally defend the female heroine against attackers and assumptions (con-
trolling discourses) about her.43 This task can develop into advocacy, though as noted 
above, this impulse is more limited in La Regenta. Advocacy (from ad-vocare) in these 
novels means first of all to articulate the speech that the characters do not utter, either 
because they do not speak (Effi) or say the wrong things (Ana). Since Effi herself seems 
to only partially understand the violence being done to her and does not speak about it, 
and since it is unknown whether or how she registers that violence, it is up to the reader “
to jump in,” that is, to be the deus ex machina and to act instead of her and on behalf of 
her. The reader takes note of the injustices Effi suffers, and by marking the discrepancy, 
becomes a presence. In short, the reader becomes implicated. 
The best evidence for this effect may be Rainer Werner Fassbinders famous movie 
adaption Effi Briest (1974) in which he has Effi give an inflammatory speech exposing all 
the wrongs of the society. It is a speech Fontanes Effi could never have given, but one 
that the implicated reader would very much wish to give. And does give in my opinion, for 
I would suggest that it is in fact the implicated reader who speaks through Effi in this 
movie. 
This involvement of the reader due to a lack of a proper voice from the maligned pro-
tagonist has two seemingly contradictory effects: on the one hand, the reader sides with 
the oppressed, misunderstood, and mistreated character by preserving the knowledge of 
her suffering, even if such a character as Effi does not recognize the suffering herself. In 
fact, the readers preference becomes so strong that the reader may feel as if he or she 
were just as much a part of the novel as in Fassbinder s movie, and thus can intervene 
on Effi’s behalf; seeing the world through her eyes, actually feeling her suffering, the 
reader advocates on her behalf and takes action for her. 
On the other hand, the force that drives the reader into the story as if he or she were 
a character can produce the effect that this reader develops the self-interest to preserve 
his or her presence in the novel. That is to say, for the reader to be quasi-present in the 
novel as an advocate, that reader must also affirm the suppression of the female 
protagonist. Without such a scene of suppression or violent misunderstanding, the 
reader would not intervene in the story, because there would be no reason for doing so. 
And this is the other, apparently contradictory effect: the affirmation and reduplication of 
the very misunderstanding that makes the involvement of the reader possible. 
I refer to this effect as the “implication of the reader” or the “implicated reader,” a 
wholly different entity than the implied reader. The implied reader (authorial audience) 
sides firmly against the attackers and is for the heroine, as was the case in both of the 
novels we discussed. In contrast, the implicated reader is involved to such a degree that 
he or she develops choices that are serving himself or herself first and are not directly 
prefigured by the author. In the case of La Regenta, the reader gets implicated in the 
moment he or she wishes for one of the attackers to succeed for the reason that this 
would allow for a prediction of Ana’s suffering (and thus reader empathy). In the case of 
Effi Briest, the reader gets implicated once the preference for the heroine causes the 
reader to accept and require her suppression. In effect, the implicated reader begins to 
act and behave like an independent character. 
In Effi Briest, the implicated reader must “want” a character to be misunderstood, 
since only this allows the reader to make the leap, to be involved and enter the text. Only 
thanks to this unjust misunderstanding does the implicated reader come into existence. 
In other words, the reader must want the female protagonist (or the child, the underdog, 
etc.) to be misunderstood and mistreated, since the readers involvement and existence 
depend on it. Here empathy (and side-taking) is perverted into a form of advocative, 
exploitative empathy such as was described in the first section of this chapter. 
This regression of the morally superior witness into the role of punisher experiencing 
either predictive, sadistic empathy (Clarin) or advocative, exploitative empathy (Fontane) 
is less a psychological tendency in actual readers than a structural effect of the 
implicated reader as third party.44 The reader must seek to prolong that which enables 
his or her emotional involvement. Without it, he or she would not be implicated and thus 
not exist. The process of implication has three parts: 
1. Recognition of injustice (discrepancy between what is and should be) 
2. The wish to set things straight, or for compensation (involvement) 
3. Desire for a scene of violence (oppression) that calls the reader into action 
This implication of the reader also has an effect for the protagonist as well. For example, 
Effi remains herself only because she cannot take on her own identity. This means that 
the scene in which she is misunderstood is constitutive of her identity: she is most true to 
herself when she is not allowed to be herself. The reader who observes this inability of 
Effi to be herself feels called upon to act and take Effi’s side. In doing so, the newly 
implicated reader simultaneously repudiates and affirms her oppression, and through 
this process experiences both sympathy and hidden pleasure at her suffering. 
Precisely because no one can identify with them (and because identification is staged 
as a form of violent misunderstanding), Ana Ozores and Effi Briest become objects of a 
perverse and sadistic empathy. The lack of empathy within the novel subsequently 
forces the reader into a divided, contradictory position. As a result, the reader’s interest 
in the text becomes more than merely hermeneutic or psychological, it is self-affective: it 
is the implication of the reader that brings the reader into being.45 
Clarin’s La Regenta and Fontane’s Effi Briest reveal a technique of implicating the 
reader via a mechanism that combines an other-focused empathy with a self-focused 
one. The simultaneity of the recognition of injustice, the criticism of it, and the desire for 
the punishment or oppression to continue characterizes canonical works of narrative 
fiction. It builds upon a long English-American tradition of suppressed female 
protagonists from Clarissa and Pamela in Samuel Richardsons novels to Hester Prynne 
in Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter, as well as a continental European tradition ranging 
from the mysterious Ottilie in Goethes Elective Affinities to the ironic treatment Madame 
Bovary receives. This technique is prominent in the period of realism with its “poetics of 
observation,”46 but is not limited to it. 
Within the particular context of continental European realism a gender-specific pat-
tern emerges. Like Madame Bovary, La Regenta and Effi Briest stand between the poles 
of turning a woman completely into an object, as in the works of de Sade, and of putting 
a woman on a pedestal, as in Sacher-Masoch.47 The ways in which Ana and Effi are 
oppressed demonstrate to the reader that these characters are entitled to full 
personhood, and yet they only awake the empathy of the reader when that personhood 
is withheld from them. 
La Regenta and Effi Briest give us an insight into the complex reader emotions 
involved in sadistic empathy. The triggering of empathy, at least here, comes at the price 
of the suffering of another person. Thus our empathy (and sympathy) with another 
negotiates the extremes of positive involvement on the one hand, and negative 
sentiments on the other. It is caught in this tension, oscillating between the affirmative 
experiences of sympathy, advocacy, and side-taking and the destructive desires for 
dominance, punishment, and exploitation. In these texts, empathy implicates the reader 
as though he or she were a character within the novel; a character who draws his life 
blood from the continued suffering of the victim. 
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